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Congruence between voters and parties: The role of party-level issue salience
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1Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Ireland; 2Institute of Public
Administration, Leiden University, the Netherlands; 3Department of Communication Science, Vrije
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Abstract. The level of congruence between parties and their voters can vary greatly from one policy issue
to another, which raises questions regarding the effectiveness of political representation.We seek to explain
variation in party–voter congruence across issues and parties. We focus on the hypotheses that (1) average
proximity between the positions of voters and the party they vote for will be highest on the issues that the
party emphasises in the election campaign and that (2) this relationship will be stronger for niche parties.
We test these hypotheses using data on the policy preferences of voters, party positions, party attention
profiles and salience on concrete policy issues in four countries: The Netherlands, Ireland, Germany and
Sweden. Overall, we find that voter–party proximity tends to be higher on issues that the party emphasises.
As these are the issues where parties typically have the greatest policy impact, this implies that the quality of
representation is highest where it matters most.There is some limited evidence that the positive relationship
between issue salience and proximity is stronger for niche parties. In sum, the quality of policy representation
varies strongly with party-level issue salience and to a lesser extent with the type of political party.
Keywords: congruence; issue salience; political parties; representation; voting-advice-applications
Introduction
Effective policy representation in modern party-centred democracies implies a degree of
congruence between the policy positions of parties and the policy preferences of the people
who vote for them (APSA 1950; Katz 1997; Powell 2000; Rohrschneider &Whitefield 2012;
Thomassen 1994).While previous research shows a high level of congruence between voters
and parties in terms of their general ideological orientation, it also finds that parties are often
out of step with their own voters on specific policy issues (Dalton 2017;Dolný&Baboš 2015;
Miller et al. 1999; Thomassen 2012). This is despite that fact that, as a result of cognitive
mobilisation and declining partisanship, citizens in many countries are more capable and
willing to vote based on their policy preferences than ever before (Dalton 1984). In thewords
of one prominent scholar of political representation, ‘low levels of policy congruence in a
system with more and more issue voting citizens, not only implies dangers for the individual
parties, it also implies dangers for the system as a whole’ (Holmberg 1999).
One explanation for relatively low levels of issue congruence is that in most developed
democracies, party and voter preferences are not structured by a single, overarching left-
right dimension (e.g.,Lesschaeve 2017;Thomassen 2012).Where parties compete on several
∗The first two authors contributed equally to the paper; thereafter the ordering is alphabetical.
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unrelated issue dimensions, voters may agree with a party on one set of issues while
disagreeing with it on others, and it becomes extremely difficult for voters to find a party
that represents their views well across the spectrum of policy issues. Yet issue congruence
is not uniformly low: there tends to be considerable variation in the level of party–voter
congruence across issues and parties. As Jacques Thomassen noted back in 1994, ‘one of
the most important challenges … is to explain why political parties are representative of
their voters on some issues, but not on others’. This article seeks to explain this variation
in the proximity of parties to their voters. To do so, we look to parties’ issue emphasis. By
emphasising a particular issue, a party seeks to attract voters who care about that issue and
agree with its position. It may be the case that, as many have argued, voters are generally
ignorant of party policy (e.g., Achen & Bartels 2016). However, to the extent that voters do
evaluate party policy positions, this is most likely to be in relation to the issues that the party
emphasises in its campaign. We therefore expect that congruence between a party and its
voters will be highest on these issues.
We also consider the possibility that the relationship between parties’ issue emphasis
and congruence differs between niche and mainstream parties. Niche parties build their
reputation and identity only with reference to very few issues of disproportionately high
salience to them and to their voters, while mainstream parties are less consistent in their
issue emphasis over time (Wagner 2012). We therefore expect a particularly high level of
congruence for niche parties on the issues they own.
We argue that understanding how parties’ issue attention profile shapes congruence
is important from a normative perspective. We should not treat all issues equally when
assessing voter–party congruence.A party is most likely to influence public policy in relation
to the issues it prioritises, so congruence is most important in relation to these issues. As
previous research shows, there is a strong relationship between the policy priorities of
parties in government and the policies those parties emphasised in the previous election
campaign (Budge & Hofferbert 1990; Klingemann et al. 1994; see also Bischof 2018).
Selective issue emphasis by political parties is particularly important in understanding policy
under coalition government, where each member of the coalition tends to have a significant
say in shaping policy in the areas it prioritises (and very often also receives the relevant
ministerial portfolio) (Bäck et al. 2011; Ecker et al. 2015). In this article, we test whether
congruence is indeed higher on these issues, and whether this pattern holds for all parties or
just for niche parties.
We test our hypotheses using comparable data from recent elections in Germany, The
Netherlands,Sweden and Ireland.As discussed below, these cases are suitable for testing our
hypotheses because the chosen elections involved a diverse array of salient issues, including
issues not related to the economic left-right dimension; and the elections featured a mix of
mainstream parties with broad policy programmes and niche parties with a more restricted
policy focus. We find that party–level issue salience has a significant effect on voter–party
congruence: the distance between voters and their party tends to be smallest when it comes
to the issues that the party emphasises.We find only partial support for our expectation that
the relationship is stronger for niche parties thanmainstream parties.Below,we develop our
theoretical arguments regarding the effects of party issue emphasis and party type on voter–
party congruence. We then introduce our data, which includes information on the policy
preferences of voters and the policy positions and priorities of parties on a wide range of
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issues.The analysis section tests our hypotheses,and the final section concludes by discussing
the implications of the findings.
Explaining variation in voter–party proximity across issues
In line with most research on voter–party congruence, our theoretical expectations begin
with the assumption that voters consider policy proximity to parties when deciding how
to vote (e.g., Giger & Lefkofridi 2014; Thomassen 2012). This is the central premise of
the Downsian spatial model, whereby parties compete by adopting positions on issue
dimensions, and voters select the party or candidate that is closest to them on the issue
or issues that they care most about (Downs 1957). The core components of the model are
therefore the salience of the policy issue for the voter, the voter’s position on the issue and
the positions of the candidates or parties (Brody & Page 1972: 455). At the individual level,
the spatial model predicts a high degree of congruence between voters and parties on the
issues that are salient to the voter, and this is supported empirically (Gerber & Green 2000;
Giger & Lefkofridi 2014).
However, this does not tell us on which issues we should expect to find high levels of
congruence at the aggregate level. Electorates consist of different ‘issue publics’, or groups
of voters who focus on distinct sets of issues (Krosnick 1990). The existence of distinct issue
publics, with each group voting based on the issues that are salient to them, is often believed
to exacerbate the problems of political representation. Not only do parties compete on
several unrelated issue dimensions, but voters differ in terms of which issues they base their
decision on.An election outcome then communicates ‘a cacophony of desires on the part of
many small minorities’, and parties cannot reliably claim to have a clear mandate from their
voters on any given issue (Krosnick 1990: 83).
What the traditional spatial model overlooks is that parties differ not only in their policy
positions but also in the issues that they choose to emphasise in the election campaign. This
is a central assumption of many of themost well-known alternatives to theDownsian spatial
model, such as salience theory (Budge & Farlie 1983) and directional theory (Rabinowitz
& Macdonald 1989). More recently, theories of party competition and vote choice have
integrated aspects of these different approaches. For instance, the ‘issue yield’ model of De
Sio and Weber (2014) assumes that parties compete both in terms of position taking and
by strategic issue emphasis, and voters’ preferences are shaped by policy proximity. Parties
are expected to particularly emphasise what the authors refer to as ‘bridge policies’: that is
policies where their position has wide support among the party base and also has support
among other voters.By campaigning on these policies, a party can attract new voters without
affecting its core support.1
Incorporating party issue emphasis into a proximity-basedmodel of vote choice has clear
implications for voter–party congruence across issues. Policy proximity can only influence
voters’ decisions when they know what the party’s position is. Indeed, we know from
previous research that higher voter knowledge of party positions on issues leads to greater
voter–party issue congruence (Andersen et al. 2005). Voter’s knowledge of party policy
on any given issue largely depends on the amount of attention the party devotes to the
issue. Election campaigns are particularly important in this respect, as they inform voters
of where parties stand on their core issues (Gelman & King 1993). Thus, issue emphasis by
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political parties is expected to influence voter knowledge of party policy and vote choice
and, ultimately, the level of congruence across issues.
To summarise, we argue that when a party emphasises a particular issue in an election
campaign, it is likely to attract voters that agree with the party’s position on this issue, and
as a result, the average distance between the position of the party and its voters will be
relatively small. Such proximity between party and voters is less likely to occur on issues
that are not emphasised by the party and are therefore less central to voters’ evaluation of
the party. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: The average distance between the positions of voters and the party they vote for will
be smallest on the issues that the party emphasises.
While there is a growing recognition of the need to consider both party policy positions
and party issue emphasis when studying party competition and vote choice, the implications
of this for voter–party congruence has received very little attention to date. One exception
is Valen andNarud (2007),who present evidence fromNorway that voter–party congruence
is higher on a party’s core issues.However, this evidence is based on a handful of issues.One
reason for this gap in the literature is that most existing studies have looked at congruence
and representation along a general ideological dimension and have not been able to consider
variation across issues (Adams et al. 2006;Ezrow et al. 2011;Mattila &Raunio 2006).Below,
we test the hypothesis using data on 111 specific policy issues and 34 parties across four
countries.2
We also consider the possibility that voters pay more attention to long-term associations
that parties have with particular issues than to the issues parties chose to emphasise in
a specific election campaign. Of course, long-term issue associations and short-term issue
emphasis are likely to overlap considerably (Wagner &Meyer 2014: 1033).We examine the
effect of both issue emphasis and issue ownership on congruence.
While we expect the relationship specified in H1 to apply to all parties, there are reasons
to believe that it may be stronger for niche parties than for mainstream parties. Niche
parties are defined in part by their focus on a restricted set of issues and are clearly
associated with the public mind with these issues (Meguid 2005). This issue emphasis tends
not to vary significantly over time, which further cements the reputation of these parties
in relation to their key issues (Adams et al. 2006). Parties that own a small set of issues
offer little information about their stances on all other issues, or indeed deliberately blur
their positions (Rovny 2012, 2013). Mainstream parties also prioritise some issues over
others, but this focus is less consistent over time compared to niche parties. As Budge
(2015) suggests, ‘[niche party] issue emphases are likely to be even more fixed than those
of mainstream programmatic parties’. Klüver and Spoon (2016) show that large parties
are more likely to change their issue attention in response to changes in issue salience
among the public compared to small parties.3 Due to changing issue emphasis over time,
mainstream parties are likely to be less effective at communicating their issue priorities to
voters.
Furthermore, mainstream parties are typically office seeking, while niche parties are
typically policy seeking (Helboe Pedersen 2012). This suggests that the campaign focus of
niche parties will bemore heavily focused on policy,while the campaign focus ofmainstream
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parties will also focus on non-policy factors such as their ability to govern, leadership
qualities and past performance. This is supported by evidence that media coverage of
mainstream parties is more personalised than that of niche parties (Lengauer & Winder
2013). This is likely to result in differences between niche and mainstream parties in terms
of how successfully they communicate their issue priorities.
Following on from these considerations, our second hypothesis as follows:
H2: The relationship between the issue emphasis of parties and the average distance
between the positions of the voters and the party they vote for will be stronger for
niche parties.
Some previous research has examined how voter–party congruence varies between
different types of parties, with mixed results. Romeijn (2018) studies congruence between
public opinion and political parties in Germany. He finds mixed evidence about the extent
to which congruence varies between niche parties and mainstream parties, but, if anything,
niche parties appear more congruent and more responsive to levels of policy support in
the general public. Similarly, Van Ditmars and De Lange (2019) find for the case of The
Netherlands that ‘mainstream parties do not consistently represent their voters better on
specific issues or dimensions than niche parties’. In contrast, Traber et al. (2018) find in a
cross-national study that congruence is higher for government and office-seeking opposition
parties, while Belchior and Freire (2013) find that congruence is higher for catch-all parties
than for ideological parties. These contrasting findings may be due to not taking into
account the interaction between issue emphasis and party type, as implied by our second
hypothesis.
Research design and data
We test these hypotheses using data on the policy issue positions of voters and parties
and the issue emphasis of parties at the 2012 Dutch parliamentary election, the 2016
Irish parliamentary election, the 2013 German federal election and the 2010 Swedish
parliamentary election. While our case selection is constrained to a large extent by data
availability, these four countries represent a reasonably representative cross section of
established Western European multi-party democracies, as they vary on relevant factors
such as party system fragmentation, party-centeredness and party attachment. They also
feature two necessary conditions for our hypotheses to be testable: variation in the types of
active parties and a significant degree of issue-based party competition.
Ireland has one of the lowest levels of party attachment in Western Europe, and Sweden
one of the highest (Andeweg&Farrell 2017).While thismay affect the overall level of voter–
party congruence in these countries, it is not expected to play a conditioning role in relation
to our hypotheses. The Netherlands, Germany and Sweden have party-centred electoral
systems, whereas Ireland has a candidate-centred electoral system in which candidate
attributes play an important role in vote choice (Marsh 2007).This has the effect of reducing
the importance of policy-based competition in elections in Ireland relative to the other
countries.We might therefore expect to find weaker support for our hypotheses in the Irish
case. There are also differences in the party system across the four cases that might affect
C© 2020 European Consortium for Political Research
CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND PARTIES 97
the results. The Netherlands has a highly fragmented party system that features a number
of what are essentially single-issue parties (such as the Party for the Animals); whereas the
party systems in the other countries are somewhat less fragmented.4 We therefore anticipate
that there will be stronger support for H2 in the case of the Netherlands.
Note however that we do not have strong and specific hypotheses about how the
relationships we study should vary across the four countries. We expect our hypotheses
to hold in all cases. To the extent that we find that these relationships vary in different
contexts, we leave it for future research to formulate and test hypotheses about this
variation at the level of the political and party systems. We return to this point in the
conclusion.
In terms of our main variables of interest (issue emphasis and party type), there is
considerable variation within each country. The party systems in these four countries
include a mixture of mainstream parties with broad issue-attention profiles (such as Fine
Gael in Ireland and Christian Democratic Appeal in The Netherlands) and niche parties
with a narrow issue-attention profile (such as the Freedom Party in The Netherlands and
the Anti-Austerity Alliance in Ireland). The parties in these elections campaigned on a
diverse set of issues, including immigration, water charges, housing, crime and European
integration.
Our data on the issue positions of voters and parties comes from voting advice
applications (VAAs): WhichCandidate in Ireland, Kieskompas in The Netherlands,
Bundeswahlkompass in Germany andValkompass in Sweden. In all cases, a team of country
experts selected a list of issues that were salient for political competition, comprehensive
and balanced in terms of scope, and associated with policy differences between the parties
(further details can be found in Costello 2017 and Krouwel et al. 2012). In total, 30 issues
were included in the Dutch,German and Swedish versions, and 21 issues in the Irish version.
Our dataset contains the verified positions of the political parties in each country and
the positions of a very large opt-in panel of respondents in each country on the same
issues. Descriptive information on our datasets is provided in the Supporting Information,
including summaries of the overall level of agreement between voters and parties across
issues.
One advantage of using VAAdata for the study of voters–party representation is that we
can match the positions of voters and parties on the same issues without resorting to scaling
and latent dimensions that lack clear substantive interpretation. Another advantage comes
from the sheer number of responses that the VAAs have: even after we restrict the sample
of responses to those who have completed the policy positions and the party preference
questions,we are left withmore than 43 thousand responses in TheNetherlands,42 thousand
in Sweden,18 thousand inGermany and 21 thousand in Ireland.This means that even for the
small parties we have a sufficient number of responses from their supporters, unlike studies
that use traditional nationally representative public opinion surveys, which either have to
drop small parties or use less than a dozen of respondents to reconstruct the positions of
their supporters.As a result,we can estimate reliably the policy preferences of the supporters
of small parties as well (see Costello 2017,which shows that the estimates of the preferences
of party supporters from VAAs and from modelled responses from large probability-based
surveys agree to a very large extent).
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Measuring party–voter proximity
The outcome of interest in our study is the distance between the positions of the voters
of the party and the position of the party. The distance measure that we use is based on the
positions of voters and parties on concrete policy issues,expressed on the same scale.For The
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, the positions on policy issues are measures on a five-
point ordinal scalewith response categories ‘Strongly agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Disagree’,and
‘Strongly disagree’, and the party positions are derived from analyses of official documents,
newspapers and other sources. For Ireland, the positions are measured on a three-point
ordinal scale, and the party positions are based on a survey of political parties. Distance
on a policy issue for a party is measured as the average of the absolute distances between
the party position and the positions of each of its voters. The distances for the Irish case are
rescaled to match the scale used in the other countries (i.e., ranging from a minimum of 0 to
a maximum of 4).
We identify the supporters of parties by the declared prospective vote. In Ireland,
respondents were asked to indicate who they intend to give their first preference vote to
in the upcoming election. In The Netherlands this is captured by a question about which
party the respondent is most likely to vote for (only one choice possible). In Germany and
Sweden, the prospective vote is captured by a series of questions asking for the probability
of the respondent to vote for each of the parties competing at the election on a scale from
1 to 10. We take respondents who picked at least ‘9’ for one party and no more than ‘8’ for
any other party. In all cases, questions about vote intention were asked before respondents
were provided with information on their policy match with parties.
While there are a number of benefits to using VAA data to study congruence, one
potential drawback is the opt-in nature of the voter sample. However, while sample bias
may affect the estimates for the level of proximity, our focus is on understanding the factors
that drive variation in proximity across issues, which is less likely to be affected by this. We
also run additionalmodels (reported in the Supporting Information) where the voter sample
is weighted to be representative of the population in terms of age, education, gender, left-
right orientation, vote and urban/rural location. The results with these models do not alter
the main findings of the analyses presented below.
Measuring issue salience
To measure party-specific issue salience, we rely on three different indicators. The first and
main one is based on new coding of theManifesto Project data (Krause et al. 2018).For each
party and each policy issue, we identify relevant statements in the election manifesto of the
party that referred specifically to this policy issue (not to the underlying policy or ideological
dimension), and we record the number of these statements.We calculate the share of these
statements from all statements in the party manifesto using a logarithmic transformation,
as recommended by Lowe et al. (2011). We then standardise this number by subtracting
the average salience of the issue across all parties. The following formula shows the exact
calculation method, where xip is the number of statements in the manifesto of party p on
issue i, xp is the total number of issue statements in the manifesto of party p and N is the
number of parties:
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The standardisation by the average salience of the issue ensures that we capture
differences across parties within issues and not across issues as such. It is to be expected
that an issue such as increasing the pension age will attract more attention from all parties
than an issue such as a burka ban, but what is relevant for our theoretical argument is the
relative party emphasis on each of these issues compared to the emphasis they receive from
the other parties (cf. Budge 2015 who argues that ‘it is not the issues most emphasised by
parties which distinguish them from other parties but those they uniquely emphasise’). The
standardisation by the length of the party manifesto is made to correct for the fact that
some parties have much longer manifestos than others, which allows them to have more
statements on an issue. Parties receive a limited amount of attention from voters and must
choose how to distribute their focus across issues, so it is the amount of attention a party
gives to one issue relative to other issues that matters.
For Ireland, we also have a second measure of party issue emphasis, based on a survey
of candidates standing in the election. The candidate survey was administered as part of
the VAA used in this study. Candidates were asked to list their top three issue priorities
(in an open-ended question format). For each of the 21 policy issues included in the Irish
case,we counted the number of candidates from each party that listed the issue as a priority,
and standardised this in themanner described in the previous paragraph.More details of this
measure,along with the results of the analysis using this measure,are given in the Supporting
Information.
In the Supporting Information,we also report results for The Netherlands,Germany and
Sweden based on an alternative measure of issue salience that tracks the fraction of party
supporters that have expressed an opinion on a policy issue question, calculated for each
party and issue separately. We consider respondents who have not expressed an opinion
as those who have answered a policy issue question with ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Neutral’. This is
based on the idea that people have more accessible attitudes on issues that are salient to
them (Krosnick 1990; Lavine et al. 1996). Our assumption is that party supporters would
have been more likely to express an opinion on an issue, if this issue had been emphasised
by the party in its communication.Hence, the relative share of voters with an opinion on an
issue can proxy the salience that the party puts on the issue.We standardise this measure by
the issue-level average across all parties, for the reasons explained above. The results using
these alternative measures are substantively the same as the results presented below.
Measuring party nicheness
Our second hypothesis concerns the distinction between niche and mainstream parties.
We employ two alternative measures for this. We construct a continuous measure of party
nicheness in the following way. First, we start with calculating the party’s relative attention
to all issues in its manifesto, using the issue categories in the Manifesto Project data. Then,
following the approach of Meyer and Miller (2015: 262), we compute the deviation of a
party’s issue attention profile from the overall system-level agenda. The values are then
standardised by subtracting the average level of deviation of all parties from the particular
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issue attention profile score of a party. The following formula shows the precise definition
and calculation of the measure (where xip is the emphasis of party p on issue i and Xi,–p the










Our second measure involves classifying parties as either niche or mainstream.A binary
classification of ‘niche’ parties can be controversial, but we use this in a very specific sense,
namely parties that overwhelmingly focus their attention to a relatively small number of
policy issues, relative to the attention paid to these issues by other parties in the political
system. Building on the classifications in Budge et al. (2001), Adams et al. (2006), Budge
(2015), and the overview in Wagner (2012), we end up categorising the following parties
as ‘niche parties’ in the four countries: Anti-Austerity Alliance, Green Party, and Renua in
Ireland;GreenLeft, Party for Freedom, the Reformed Party, the Party of the Animals in The
Netherlands; the Green Party, The Left, the Pirates, the National Democratic Party (NPD),
andAlternative forGermany (AfD) inGermany;and theCenter Party, the Left, the Swedish
Democrats and the Green Ecological Party in Sweden.
Additional variables
To explore whether it is issue salience as such that matters for congruence or merely the
issue type,we use a variable that tracks whether or not the individual issues fit into the socio-
economic left-right dimension. Much of the existing literature highlights a general pattern
whereby issues associated with the left-right dimension have higher levels of congruence
than other issues (Costello et al. 2012; Dalton 2017). The left-right dimension might be
expected to be associated with higher levels of voter–party congruence because it serves
as a heuristic device to simplify the voting decision (Thomassen 2012). Voters can generally
place themselves on the left-right dimension and have a view on where the parties stand in
left-right terms (Van Der Brug & Van der Eijk 1999). Issues related to taxes, redistribution,
welfare and government intervention in the economy were coded as belonging to this
dimension.5
Empirical results
We start the presentation of the empirical results by showing three statistical models
estimated on the combined data from all four countries.We include country fixed effects in
the model specifications to account for differences in the average distance between voters
and parties across the four countries. We then present more detailed results from each of
the four countries we study, including a party-by-party summary of the relationship between
issue emphasis and voter–party distance.
Combined data analysis
Table 1 shows the results of three linear regression models of average distance. Model 1.1
features party-specific issue salience and the continuous measure of party nicheness, as well
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Table 1. Multivariate linear regression models of distance between voters and parties, four countries
Outcome variable
Average distance between the policy positions of voters and parties
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3
Party issue salience –0.04* –0.01 –0.04*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Nicheness (cont.) 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)








Germany –0.04 –0.03 –0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Sweden 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ireland –0.11** –0.11** –0.11**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.18***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 891 891 891
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,299.94 1,300.13 1,301.88
Note: The Netherlands is the reference category for the country fixed effects, as the country where the effect
is closest to the average one in the whole sample. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
as their interaction. Model 1.2 replaces the continuous measure of nicheness with a binary
indicator. Model 1.3 adds an indicator for left-right issues.
According to the results reported in the table, issue salience has the expected negative
association with the average distance between the policy positions of voters and parties.
The coefficient of issue salience is statistically significant at the 0.10 level in two of the three
model specifications.The estimated coefficient of 0.04 in models 1 and 3 implies that moving
from the minimum to the maximum issue salience observed in the data would decrease
the preference distance by 0.26, which is approximately half of one standard deviation in
distance (these calculations assume a party with an average nicheness score of zero). A
model without the interaction term returns practically the same value and standard error
for the coefficient of issue salience – 0.04 and 0.02, respectively – as model 1.Altogether, the
results are compatible with Hypothesis 1.
The second hypothesis requires that we examine the interaction between issue salience
and nicheness.Nicheness as such is not consistently associated with distance.The interaction
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effect is also not consistent across the model specifications: it is negative in one (but not
significant) and positive in the other two, so H2 is not supported in the pooled analysis.
However, the relatively large standard errors in the models in Table 1 suggest that there is
significant heterogeneity in the relationships that is worth exploring further by analysing the
data from each country separately. Instead of adding interactions with each country in the
models above, which would complicate the presentation of the results, we show scatterplots
of the relationships of interest for each party in each country and we report more detailed
country-specific statistical models in the Supporting Information.
Country-level analysis
TheNetherlands. The fragmented party system inTheNetherlands, featuring a large number
of parties that differ significantly in their issue-attention profile, with some having a
characteristically ‘niche’ profile, should provide a favourable setting for finding support for
the theoretical hypotheses.
Figure 1 shows that the effect of issue salience on preference distance is strongly
moderated by party type. The linear ordinary least squares (OLS) line through the data
points slopes downwards for parties with a high ‘nicheness’ score (the parties are ordered
according to their nicheness), while most of the mainstream parties exhibit either no
relationship or a positive one. This suggests that party-specific issue salience decreases the
average distance between parties and voters for niche parties,but not formainstreamparties.
TheGreen Left party defies this pattern as it exhibits a positive link,while being classified as
a niche party, but the classification can be contested as the party has adopted a rather broad
attention profile in the past decade.The People’s Party for Freedom andDemocracy (VVD)
exhibits a negative link,while being a mainstream party, but in fact its issue-attention profile
is scored as rather narrow, at least according to its election manifesto. These inferences are
confirmed by examining the table with regression results from the Dutch data only, which
show a significant interaction effect between nicheness and salience (see the Supporting
Information).
To sum up the Dutch results, we have rather strong evidence that greater issue emphasis
by parties is associated with greater voter–party congruence, but only in the case of niche
parties. These patterns lend support to Hypothesis 2.
Ireland. While traditionally dominated by the two large centrist parties Fine Gael and
Fianna Fáil, the Irish party system has become increasingly fragmented in recent years. A
number of new parties have emerged, including the Social Democrats, Renua Ireland, and
the left-wing grouping of the Anti-Austerity Alliance (later renamed Solidarity) and People
Before Profit. Figure 2 plots the relationship between party issue emphasis and voter–party
distance for each of the main Irish parties that contested the 2016 election.
The plot in Figure 2 reveals that in Ireland the relationship between party issue salience
and distance is similar for niche and mainstream parties: in both cases, distance decreases
sharply with salience. The plots show that the negative relationship between salience and
distance is found for all parties except Fine Gael, with the slope being the steepest for Sinn
Féin and the Anti-Austerity Alliance.6 In sum, the Irish case provides strong support for
our first hypothesis: that is, the average distance between voters and the party they vote
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Figure 1. Preference distance and issue salience per party, The Netherlands (2012).
Notes: The panels show the scaled party-level issue salience against preference distance per party. Each dot
represents one of 30 policy issues. The solid lines are linear OLS fits, while the dotted lines show cubic
smoothing spline fits. The grey horizontal dashed lines show the mean distance for the party across all
issues. The panels are ordered on the basis of increasing nicheness of the parties according to the continuous
measure described in the text. The party names in the titles of the panels are in bold for mainstream parties
and in italic for niche parties according to the binary classification.
Data: Kieskompass and Manifesto Project.
for is smallest when it comes to issues of high salience to the party. In contrast, there is
no evidence in support for our second hypothesis. The effect of the interaction between a
party’s issue attention profile and issue salience is close to zero for all Irish models (reported
in the Supporting Information). The findings are the same when the candidate survey-based
measure of party issue salience is used instead of the manifesto-based measure.
Germany. Germany features a moderate number of parties with almost all, including the
Greens (which has previously been classified as a niche party), adopting a rather broad
agenda encompassing a variety of policy issues. This should make it hard to find support
for the second hypothesis, as there are no typical niche parties and limited variation in the
issue-attention profiles of the parties.
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Figure 2. Preference distance and issue salience per party, Ireland (2016).
Notes: See the notes to Figure 1 for an explanation of the figure.
Data:WhichCandidate and Manifesto Project.
Looking at the relationship between issue salience and distance per party (Figure 3)
reveals a lot of heterogeneity. For the two parties with the most narrow issue-attention
profile,AfD and NDP (for which, however, no exact scores are available from theManifesto
Project data, so the issue salience is based on the VAA-derived measure), there is a rather
strong negative relationship between party-specific issue salience and distance. This is also
true, to a smaller extent, for the Socialist Party and The Left. Some parties, however – the
Greens most notably – exhibit a positive relationship, so that the party is most distant from
its voters on some of the issues it has emphasised most in its electoral manifesto (relative
to other parties), for example, the liberalisation of soft drugs (marijuana). Yet for other
parties, such as the Pirates, there is no relationship between distance and salience at all.
The lack of strong relationships in the data for Germany is also confirmed in the statistical
models (see Supporting Information),where neither themain variables nor their interaction
is significant.
To sum up the results for Germany, we do not find strong support for our hypotheses.
There is, however, a lot of heterogeneity between the parties, with some fitting the
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Figure 3. Preference distance and issue salience per party, Germany (2013).
Notes: See the notes to Figure 1 for an explanation of the figure.
Data: Bundeswahlkompass and Manifesto Project.
hypothesised patterns well (AfD, NPD and the Left), while others not (the Greens,
CDU/CSU and the Pirates).
Sweden. Finally, we turn to the Swedish case. Sweden features many political parties in a
rather fragmented political system, but one with relatively strong left and right blocks. But
the country presents a real challenge for classifying parties into mainstream or niche, with
many of the parties exhibiting some features of niche parties, such as a strong focus on a
select few issues, but at the same time addressing a broad swathe of other policy issues as
well (see, e.g., Cowell-Meyers 2017).
In Sweden, as visible in Figure 4, the relationship between issue salience and preference
distance is negative for most parties, and the slope is slightly steeper for the ‘niche’ parties.
The steepness does not seem to increase linearly with the narrowness of the party attention
profile, by which the panels of the figure, and respectively the parties, are ordered.
The statistical models confirm this picture7. Salience has a negative association with
distance across all model specifications, and is significant in two. The effect of nicheness
is positive, implying that the distance between voters and their party tends to be larger
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Figure 4. Preference distance and issue salience per party, Sweden (2010).
Notes: See the notes to Figure 1 for an explanation of the figure.
Data: Valkompass and Manifesto Project.
for niche parties. The interaction effect between the binary measure of nicheness and issue
salience is negative and significant. The left-right indicator itself has a negative association
with distance, meaning that left-right issues tend to be more congruent.
To sum up the Swedish results, issue salience has a negative effect on distance, and there
is some evidence for a negative interaction with nicheness, while the latter might have a
positive effect on its own.
Issue ownership
As discussed in the theoretical section, the concept of issue salience is related to the concept
of issue ownership. In Table 2 we report results of three statistical models following the
specifications from Table 1, with the difference being that issue ownership rather than
issue salience is the main independent variable. Issue ownership has been assigned on the
basis of the party family of the respective party and the nature of the issue, building on
the classifications by Budge (2015) and Wagner and Meyer (2014). This is a dichotomous
indicator, which identifies whether or not the party in question is associated with the issue.
C© 2020 European Consortium for Political Research
CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND PARTIES 107
Table 2. Multivariate linear regression models of distance between voters and parties and issue ownership,
four countries
Outcome variable
Average distance between the policy positions of voters and parties
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3
Issue ownership (binary) –0.16*** –0.07 –0.17***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Nicheness (cont.) 0.004 0.003
(0.01) (0.01)








Germany –0.03 –0.01 –0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Sweden 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ireland –0.10* –0.05 –0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 1.21*** 1.20*** 1.20***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 891 974 891
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,284.49 1,417.43 1,285.43
Note: The Netherlands is the reference category for the country effects. The Netherlands is the reference
category for the country fixed effects, as the country where the effect is closest to the average one in the
whole sample. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
While it is not possible with our design to disentangle whether issue salience or issue
ownership are more relevant for moderating congruence between voters and parties, we
can at least see whether the patterns we find using the issue salience data are similar to the
ones we can find using issue ownership as a predictor of preference distance. Issue ownership
is positively correlated with issue salience in the combined dataset (0.11).
Altogether, issue ownership also exhibits a negative association with distance, and one
that is significant in two of the three reported specifications. The effect is comparable in size
and consistency to the one of issue salience.8 The interaction with nicheness is also negative,
and significant in the secondmodel,which uses a dichotomous indicator for niche parties.We
therefore observe similar results regardless of whether we measure party salience in terms
of the issues emphasised in the election campaign or long-term issue associations. It seems
likely that both short- and long-term issue attention matters for congruence. Some of the
issues in our data are new issues that arose in the context of the specific election campaign
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(e.g., the water charges issue in Ireland), and these show the high levels of congruence for
parties that emphasised them (e.g., the AAA in Ireland). We also observe high levels of
congruence when it comes to issues that a party is deemed to ‘own’, such as Green parties
and environmental issues.
Conclusion
We set out to explain variation in congruence between the policy preferences of voters
and political parties across issues. Our focus has been on the theoretical expectations
that party issue salience should increase congruence but that the effect will differ for
niche and mainstream parties. We find the strongest support for the hypothesis that the
distance between the policy positions of voters and parties decreases with party-specific
issue salience. There is a significant negative effect of salience on distance in the pooled
analysis, and also in the country-level analyses for Ireland and Sweden. Indeed, for most
parties in each country, there is a negative relationship between party issue salience and
distance. Hence, we consider the data is broadly consistent with our first hypothesis.
The results are more ambiguous when it comes to the interaction between issue salience
and issue attention profile.With regard to this hypothesis, theDutch and Swedish cases stand
out with the clearest evidence in favour. The Netherlands and Sweden are more likely cases
to observe the hypothesised effect as they feature more parties with some, especially in The
Netherlands, having a clear niche profile. Across all four cases, Green parties (which are
classified as niche parties) in particular stand out against our hypothesis.Our data shows that
Green parties are generally congruent with their voters on environmental issues, but these
parties also prioritise other issues that are not related to the environment, and congruence
tends to be lower on these. It may be the case that parties who are exclusively associated
with one type of issue find it difficult to communicate their policies on other issues that they
prioritise, thereby lowering congruence.
Our findings contribute to the literature on representation in a number of ways. Previous
research has focused on differences in voter–party congruence for different types of parties
(e.g., Dalton 2017), or for different types of issues (e.g., Thomassen 2012). In contrast, our
results suggest that congruence depends (in part) on which issues each party emphasises in
the election. It is unlikely that these patterns depend on the underlying type of policy issue
– whether it maps onto the left-right dimension or not. This variable itself is not consistently
associated with the quality of representation across the countries,with a positive association
with preference distance in The Netherlands but a negative one in Sweden and none in
Ireland andGermany.While previous research has found that congruence is often higher on
issues related to the left-right dimension,our findings imply that this is becausemany parties
emphasis on left-right issues. Our results also contribute to the recent debates about the
closeness of niche parties to their voters (Giger&Lefkofridi 2014,Dalton 2017, vanDitmars
&DeLange 2019).We find that,with the possible exception of Sweden,niche parties are not,
on average,more distant from the positions of their voters across all issues than mainstream
parties.
To the extent that many extreme and radical right political parties in Europe
predominantly focus on a small number of issues – immigration, Islam,European integration
– our findings shed light on the relationship between these parties and their voters. Since
C© 2020 European Consortium for Political Research
CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND PARTIES 109
these issues are disproportionately salient for these parties and for their voters, we can
expect a high level of preference congruence on these issues. At the same time, the lower
salience of all other policy issues for these parties means that they have a much freer hand,
unchecked by their voters, on them. Unlike parties with a broader selection of issues to
emphasise, radical right parties might be less constrained by popularity concerns when they
make decisions on anything other than their ‘core’ issues of concern.
Our results are based on a sample of four countries selected to be broadly representative
of the range of party systems in Western Europe, within the constraints of data availability.
A limiting factor for the generalisability of our findings beyond the four cases we analyse
is the presence of niche parties in the political system at all. But with the rising success of
challenger parties across Europe, even in countries which until recently were dominated by
a small number of catch-all, mainstream parties organised around a broad ideology (such
as Spain), the phenomenon of differential congruence between parties and voters that we
find is likely to have general relevance for multi-party parliamentary democracies. Another
requirement for generalisation is that political competition revolves around policy issues,
and not around personalities or identity-based party loyalties. Again, recent developments
indicate that issue voting at the expense of rigid party loyalties is becomingmore rather than
less relevant.
With regard to the normative implications, it is reassuring that congruence is higher on
the issues that the parties emphasise in their campaigns.While in an ideal world congruence
would be high on all issues, the multidimensional nature of the issue space makes this
very unlikely. Yet it is particularly important that congruence is high when it comes to a
party’s core issues. Parties rarely if ever act on all of the policy commitments outlined in
their manifesto, particularly in the context of coalition government (Thomson et al. 2017);
but they can be expected to act on the issues that they prioritise. This is not to say that
low congruence on other issues is unproblematic. The issues a party prioritises are not
necessarily the social problems of utmost importance or urgency. Moreover, once they get
in power parties need to decide on all kinds of policy issues, including issues that they have
not emphasised in their campaigns. Future research should examine whether voter–party
congruence for parties that enter government is higher in relation to policy promises that
are subsequently acted upon, compared to promises that go unfulfilled.
Finally, it is notable that our empirical results differ substantially across the four elections
we study.These different patterns could be due to the characteristics of the specific elections
we examine. For instance, it is possible that the effect of party issue emphasis on congruence
will be greater in volatile elections, where issue-based voting is widespread, compared to
elections that take place during periods of political stability, where more people vote based
on habit and party loyalties. Of the four elections examined here, the Irish election was
the most volatile (according to the Pedersen index), and in this election we observe the
strongest relationship between party issue salience and congruence. It is also possible that
the differences we observe reflect more systematic differences in the political and party
systems. For instance, the German federal structure might lead parties to communicate
their message differently in different regions, reducing the effect of party issue salience on
congruence. Future efforts to account for differences across countries and elections would
benefit from using a sample of policy issues that is the same across the countries, as different
policy issues might be systematically related with different patterns of congruence, but this
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implies that some of the policy issues might not be politically salient at all in some of the
countries.
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Replication Files
Notes
1. Klüver and Spoon find that parties also respond to changes in voters’ issue priorities, with more
responsiveness for large parties and opposition parties (2016) andmore responsiveness onmore polarised
issues (Spoon & Klüver 2015).
2. The causal mechanism behind H1 assumes that voters have exogenous policy preferences, and when
deciding how to vote they evaluate each party based on its position on the issues it emphasises. The
relationship between issue emphasis and congruence is therefore driven by vote choice. However,
an alternative top-down mechanism is also plausible, whereby the policy preferences of partisans are
influenced by the policy positions and issue attention of the party they support. We consider this
alternative mechanism in the Supporting Information, where we provide evidence that suggests that the
top-down mechanism does not drive patterns in voter–party congruence across issues.
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3. They also examine niche parties and find that they are less likely than other parties to change their issue
priorities in response to public opinion, although this relationship was not statistically significant (p. 644).
4. Ireland has a relatively high score for in terms of the effective number of parties (seeMichael Gallagher’s
election indices, https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/Elec
tionIndices.pdf), but this is partly driven by the high number of independent candidates.
5. In the Irish case, factor analysis showed that items relating to new taxes introduced during the financial
crisis (a water charges and a property tax) formed a separate dimension (see Costello 2017), and so these
items are not classified as left-right issues here.
6. The manifesto-based salience measure is not available for Renua Ireland, as the data are not in the
Manifesto Project corpus, so the results for this party are based on an analysis that uses the candidate
survey-based salience measure. The statistical tables are provided in the Supporting Information.
7. The issue profile (continuous nicheness) measure is not available for Feministiskt initiativ and Pirates
(data not in Manifesto Project corpus). So Feministiskt initiativ and Pirates data feature in the models
with the nicheness dummy, but not in the models with continuous nicheness. There are missing party
positions for the Pirate party.
8. The coefficient for issue ownership in Table 2 is larger than the coefficient for issue salience in Table 1,
but the former is a dichotomous variable while the latter is a scale with a range of approximately 4 to 5
points, depending on the country.
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